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In following a policy of restraint, India had two other major considerations in view. First, if it was to be war, it should come at a time of her choosing. Careful planning and preparations were necessary. Military operations in East Pakistan could not be undertaken during the monsoon when the large number of rivers and rivulets there would be in flood and the marshes impassable. The Himalayan passes would get snowbound only in winter making it impossible for China to intervene and send troops to aid Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini also needed time to gain enough strength to confront the Pakistani army in regular warfare. Secondly, the government realized that international opinion had to be educated and won over to the cause of Bangladesh and made aware of India's predicament about the refugees and how they were placing an unbearable burden on India endangering its economic and political stability. For the next eight months, India followed a four-pronged policy. India not only gave sanctuary to the Bangladesh government in exile, but the Indian army gave military training on Indian soil and material aid in money and military equipment to the Mukti Bahini. The Indian government was also generous in providing food, clothing, shelter and medical aid to the refugees in spite of its being a tremendous strain on India’s resources. Almost from the outset in April 1971, the Indian armed forces began to prepare for swift military action, though in utmost secrecy, in case a peaceful solution of the refugee problem could not be found. India’s campaign received a very positive response from the media, the intelligentsia, and the students in the West and ultimately from the West European governments besides the people and the governments of the Soviet Union and other European Communist countries. However, the governments of the United States and China adopted an unsympathetic and even hostile attitude towards India. Ignoring Indian protest, the US continued to supply arms to Pakistan. It also tried to pose the problem of Bangladesh primarily as an issue between India and Pakistan rather than one of Bangladesh's independence. China was supportive of Pakistan as it had become virtually its ally. In July-August 1971 Pakistan had helped to bring about a US-China detente. To secure itself against a possible US-China intervention in case events led to a war, on 9 August India swiftly signed a 20-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty provided for immediate mutual consultations and appropriate effective measures in case of either country being subjected to a military threat. Convinced from the beginning that a war with Pakistan on the Bangladesh issue and the problem of the refugees was inevitable, India was prepared for it by November-end. However, she was reluctant to take action first, even though the Indian army was ready and infact 4 December had been designated as the day the Indian armed forces would directly undertake the liberation of Bangladesh. At this stage, Yahya Khan obliged by pushing the button first. On 3 December, Pakistan’s air force launched a surprise attack on eight military airfields in western India, hoping to inflict serious damage on the Indian air force and also to internationalize the Bangladesh issue and secure UN intervention. However, he was to fail in both objectives. The Indian air force was relatively unharmed; anticipating a Pakistani attack, the Indian air force had withdrawn beforehand to interior airfields. |
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